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INTRODUCTION
Most bankruptcy practitioners, scholars, and courts readily agree
1
on one thing: the 2005 Bankruptcy Act (“the 2005 Act”) is poorly
drafted.
*

John Rao is an attorney with the National Consumer Law Center, Inc.
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One court has observed:
After reading the several hundred pages of text in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 . . . , one
conclusion is inescapable. The new law is not a model of clarity.
Implementing the changes will present a daunting challenge to
judges, clerk’s offices, attorneys and the parties who seek relief in
the bankruptcy court after October 17, 2005, the date most of the
2
provisions become effective.

With only a handful of the new provisions addressed thus far in the
initial decisions, it is already evident that courts face a significant
challenge in deciding the extent to which the plain words of the
statute should be given effect, particularly when the language
produces an improbable result or is at odds with the statute’s
apparent intent. This task is made far more difficult by the lack of
reliable legislative history for legislation that effectively spans seven
3
Congresses (from the 103rd to the 109th Congress). Congress did
not issue a formal conference report with the 2005 Act, and the
section-by-section analysis and discussion in the House Report largely
4
paraphrases the statute.
This Article reviews the statutory construction approaches taken in
the initial decisions and considers several provisions likely to generate
controversy in the future. Given that Congress was repeatedly warned
of the many potential drafting errors and their likely impact, courts
may reasonably infer that Congress’ choice of language was
5
deliberate. Although admittedly not an easy task, courts should
resist the temptation to reform what might appear to be a scrivener’s
error and search for some plausible, though perhaps not intended,
construction of the plain words. As the Supreme Court stated in
Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, “[t]here is a basic difference between filling a
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1532).
2. In re Kaplan, 331 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
3. See In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (noting that
“[l]egislative history is virtually useless as an aid to understanding the language and
intent of BAPCPA”); see also Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (detailing
the legislation’s history).
4. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), as reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
5. Kenneth N. Klee, law professor at the UCLA School of Law and a former
congressional staffer who helped draft the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, stated that “even
when we showed them pages and pages of grammatical and typographical errors,”
congressional staff “largely spurned the efforts . . . to work out linguistic issues.”
Justin Scheck, Bankruptcy Rewrite Predicted to Bring a Flood of Appeals, THE RECORDER,
Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=
1139306710471.
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gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has
6
affirmatively and specifically enacted.”
UNDEFINED TERMS

I.

Several provisions of the 2005 Act use terms that are not defined or
have not previously been found in bankruptcy legislation. Recent
decisions of the Supreme Court have taught that the first (and often
last) step should be to refer to the common dictionary for a
7
Another accepted approach in construing
definition of terms.
undefined terms is to consider any common meaning the words have
been given over time in judicial decisions, preferably by courts
8
applying the Bankruptcy Code.
A. When is a Case No Longer “Pending”?
9

The court in In re Moore used these two approaches to determine at
what point a bankruptcy case is no longer “pending” for purposes of
10
the new stay limitation provisions. If a prior case of the debtor was
“pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed,”
section 362(c)(3) provides that the automatic stay expires thirty days
11
after the filing of the new case, unless extended by the court. In
Moore, the debtor’s previous case was dismissed prior to the one-year
period, but the case remained open after dismissal and was eventually
12
closed by the court during the one-year period.
To determine
whether section 362(c)(3) applied, the court had to construe the
13
word “pending,” which the Code does not define. The court turned
to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “pending” as “remaining
14
undecided; awaiting decision.”
This definition, the court noted,
suggests “that a case is no longer ‘pending’ after dismissal; once the

6. 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
7. E.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 326 (2005) (referring to dictionaries for
the meaning of “on account of”); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998)
(citing dictionary definitions of “debt for”).
8. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)
(“The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation
to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific.”).
9. 337 B.R. 79 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2005).
10. Id. at 81; see also In re Easthope, No. 06-20366, 2006 WL 851829, at *2 (Bankr.
D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006) (positing that a case is no longer “pending” when the court
finally decides or settles the issues in the case).
11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
12. Moore, 337 B.R. at 80.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 81 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1169 (8th ed. 2004)).
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case has been dismissed, there is nothing undecided remaining.” In
addition, since the word “pending” is also used in section 109(g), the
court referred to decisions that have counted the 180-day period in
that section from the date of dismissal of the prior case, not the date
16
in which the case is closed.
Finally, the court found this
construction to be consistent with the policy reasons supporting the
stay limitations, since the automatic stay terminates in the prior case
17
on the dismissal date.
B. Form of “Certification” for Credit Counseling Waiver
The term “certification,” which had never been used in the
Bankruptcy Code prior to 2005, appears in the 2005 Act on at least
18
twenty-six occasions. No definition for the term was included in
section 101, and the Rules Committee elected not to address the
19
requirements of a certification in the Interim Bankruptcy Rules. A
split in court opinions has developed regarding the term’s
20
application in section 109.
21
In In re Hubbard, the debtor filed an unverified motion seeking a
22
waiver of the credit counseling requirement. The court found that
the motion was defective since it did not contain an affidavit,
23
24
declaration, or certification.
In Hubbard II, the court more
explicitly described the form of waiver request by construing the
word “certification” in section 109(h)(3) to mean the type of
25
document referred to as a “certificate” in 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Thus,
the debtor must file a certification which is signed by the debtor in
the form described in 28 U.S.C. § 1746, by using the language: “I

15. Id.
16. Id. (citing In re Carty, 149 B.R. 601 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) and In re
Richardson, 217 B.R. 479 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998)).
17. See id. at 82 (concluding that even if the stay limitation did apply, the stay
should be extended under section 362(c)(3)(B) because the debtor showed that the
case was filed in good faith based on changed circumstances).
18. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 109, 362, 524, 707, 1228, and 1328 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
19. On August 22, 2005, the Judicial Conference of the United States released
Interim Rules for use in bankruptcy cases from October 17, 2005 until final rules are
promulgated under the regular Rules Enabling Act process.
20. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ various
applications of the term “certification”).
21. (Hubbard I), 332 B.R. 285 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
22. Id. at 289.
23. See id. (clarifying that the motion was defective since the debtor in this case
failed to meet the requirements of section 109(h)(3)).
24. 333 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2000) (describing the necessary form for unsworn
declarations made under penalty of perjury).
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declare (or certify, verify or state) under penalty of perjury that the
26
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).”
27
Taking a different approach, the court in In re Cleaver looked to
the definitions of the word “certification” found in Black’s and
28
Webster’s dictionaries. Based on these definitions, the court found
that the debtor’s certification at a minimum should be a “written
29
statement that the signer affirms or attests to be true.” A motion
filed by the debtor’s counsel and also signed by the debtor,
presumably to verify the facts alleged, was held to be a
30
“certification.”
31
Refusing to follow Hubbard II and LaPorta, the court in In re Talib
held that the form of the certification under section 109(h)(3) is not
controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and that the certification need not be
32
a document containing a declaration under penalty of perjury.
Although a similar word is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (“certificate”),
the term “certification” is not one of the precise referenced terms in
33
that statute. In addition, the court noted that Bankruptcy Rule 1008
lists the documents in a bankruptcy case that must be verified or
34
contain an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury, and Rule
1008 was not amended to include a certification under section
35
109(h)(3). Thus, a certification is sufficient if it is signed by the
debtor and contains the required information.
Another rationale (not discussed in these cases) for finding that a
section 109(h)(3) certification need not be a sworn statement is that
Congress provided in section 362(b)(23), added by BAPCPA, that a
landlord’s “certification” relating to the automatic stay exception for
illegal drug use and endangerment of the property must be “under
36
penalty of perjury.”
The failure of Congress to include such
26. In re Hubbard (Hubbard II), 333 B.R. at 376; see also In re LaPorta, 332 B.R.
879, 881 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (clarifying that the debtor should sign his or her
“certification” and attest that the statements contained in it are correct and true).
27. 333 B.R. 430 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005).
28. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “certification” as: “1. The act of attesting. 2.
The state of having been attested. 3. An attested statement.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 241 (8th ed. 2004). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines “certify” as: “to attest esp. authoritatively or formally.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 367 (2002).
29. Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 434.
30. See id. (warning that the certification in this case “marginally comes within
[statutory requirements]”).
31. 335 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
32. Id. at 420-21.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 420; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008.
35. Talib, 335 B.R. at 420.
36. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(23) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
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language in section 109(h)(3), when it did so in another provision
enacted at the same time, suggests that Congress intended counseling
waiver certifications to be unsworn statements.
II. INEXACT DEFINITIONS
A. “Debt Relief Agency”
A “debt relief agency” is defined as any person who provides
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for
compensation or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer as defined in
37
section 110. The statutory language is certainly broad enough to
38
apply to attorneys. However, a definition of “attorney” already exists
39
in the Code, and no amendment to that section or reference to the
attorney definition has been made in the “debt relief agency”
definition. Given that section 110 narrowly defines “bankruptcy
40
41
petition preparer” and that the Code defines attorneys separately,
it is at least plausible, from a statutory construction perspective, that
Congress intended “debt relief agency” to apply to nonattorneys who
provide bankruptcy assistance, other than the preparation of
documents for filing in a bankruptcy case. A bankruptcy court in
Georgia found this inconsistency and lack of interplay in the
definitions to be a basis for a standing order holding that the new
42
debt relief agency provisions do not apply to attorneys.
43
The debtor in In re McCartney asserted a similar argument that
44
attorneys do not fall within the “debt relief agency” definition. The
37. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). “Bankruptcy assistance” is
defined as “goods or services sold or otherwise provided to an assisted person” with
the purpose of providing advice, document preparation, or representation in a
bankruptcy case or proceeding, regardless of the chapter. Id. § 101(4A).
38. In fact, it is so expansive as to potentially include attorneys who represent
individual landlords, small businesses, and nondebtor spouses as creditors in
bankruptcy cases, if they are “assisted persons” within the definition provided in
section 101(3).
39. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining “attorney” as
“attorney, professional law association, corporation, or partnership, authorized
under applicable law to practice law”).
40. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (defining “bankruptcy petition preparer” and
delineating the general duties involved in that position).
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(4), which
provides the definition of “attorney”).
42. See In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2005) (concluding that if Congress had intended the debt agency provisions
to include attorneys, it would have clearly stated so in the plain language of those
provisions).
43. 336 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006).
44. See id. at 590 (pointing to the BAPCPA’s statutory construction and legislative
history as the basis for such an argument).
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McCartney court, however, held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide
this question (as well as the question of whether the attorney
provisions violate the attorney’s First Amendment rights) because
there was no case or controversy giving rise to constitutional
45
standing. The court found that no party had threatened to enforce
the provisions against the attorney, and that the attorney had not
“sustained any real, actual, or direct harm or injury” or shown that he
was in “danger of sustaining any immediately impending harm or
46
injury.”
B. “Debtor’s Principal Residence”
Section 1322(b)(2) of the Code permits modification of secured
47
claims in Chapter 13 cases. However, an exception to the general
modification rule applies to claims “secured only by a security interest
48
in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” Before the
2005 Act, courts had held that a mobile home loan was not secured
solely by real property that was the debtor’s principal residence and
could be modified under section 1322(b)(2), if the mobile home did
49
not constitute real property under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Congress added a new definition of “debtor’s principal residence”
that may have been intended to protect mobile home lenders. The
Act defines a “debtor’s principal residence” as a residential structure,
50
without regard to whether it is attached to real property. However,
this new definition may not actually alter the treatment of mobile
homes in this situation because no corresponding change was made
to section 1322(b)(2), notably the failure to strike the “in real
property” language. While a mobile home may be the debtor’s
principal residence under the new definition, it may still be personal
property under applicable nonbankruptcy law. In that case, the debt
would not be secured “only by a security interest in real property” that is
45. Id. at 592.
46. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
48. See Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (concluding that
section 1322(b)(2) prohibits the modification of a secured lender’s contractual rights
when the lender’s secured interest is in the debtor’s principal residence).
49. E.g., In re Thompson, 217 B.R. 375, 378-79 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1998) (positing
that Congress must have intended to exclude mobile homes in the section
1322(b)(2) exception since it chose to limit the exception only to “real property”);
see also NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §
11.6.1.2.4 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing the limitations contained in section
1322(b)(2)).
50. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(13A). The definition also explicitly states that it includes
an individual condominium or cooperative unit, as well as a mobile or manufactured
home, or a trailer. Id.
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the debtor’s principal residence. The limitations on modifications
would therefore only apply if a mobile home or cooperative was
considered real property under applicable nonbankruptcy law, even
where the mobile home or cooperative is the debtor’s principal
residence. So far, no court has ruled on how the new definition
should be applied in relation to the existing language in section
1322(b)(2), but the potential lack of parallelism should not provide
grounds for deeming this to be a scrivener’s error that would merit a
51
rewriting of the statute by the courts.
III. AMBIGUOUS PHRASES
A. “Action Taken”
If an individual debtor has another bankruptcy case pending but
dismissed within one year of the present case, section 362(c)(3)(A)
provides that the automatic stay terminates “with respect to any
52
53
action taken” within thirty days after filing. In In re Paschal, the
court engaged in a thorough analysis of Congress’ use of the word
54
“act” in section 362, and compared that to its use of the word
55
“action.” This analysis, combined with several doctrines of statutory
construction, led the court to conclude that Congress must have
intended a different and more limited meaning for the words “action
56
taken.” The court held that section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the
automatic stay only for creditors who have taken a specific action
against the debtor, which must be some “formal judicial,
57
administrative or similar undertaking.” In addition, since the word
“taken” is used, meaning “an action in the past,” the creditor’s formal
action that is stayed under the new provision must have occurred
58
prior to the filing of the petition.
51. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted
into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute
to conform it to its intent. ‘It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its
drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.’”
(quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring))).
52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
53. 337 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
54. The word “act” is located in the following subsections and subparagraphs: 11
U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6).
55. The word “action” is located in the following subsections and subparagraphs:
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(4), (b)(14), (b)(16), (b)(25)(A) and (B),
and 362 (c)(3)(C)(ii).
56. Paschal, 337 B.R. at 279-81.
57. Id. at 280.
58. Id.
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B. “With Respect to the Debtor”
Among the many ways in which section 362(c)(3) is virtually
indecipherable, the phrase “with respect to” appears four times
59
within the same sentence in subparagraph (A). In his third look at
60
the confusing stay termination language, Judge Small in In re Jones
considered the last use of the phrase in subparagraph (a), “with
61
respect to the debtor.” The court in Jones appropriately began its
analysis with the following introduction: “Once again, warily, and
with pruning shears in hand, the court re-enters the briar patch that
is § 362(c)(3)(A). Having been here before is of some help, in that
62
at least the thorns and thickets have a certain familiarity.”
Employing a now familiar approach, Judge Small compared the
plain words of the phrase with examples in section 362, and in other
sections of the Code, in which Congress distinguishes between
63
property of the debtor and property of the estate. As in Paschal, the
court also gave considerable significance to the fact that Congress
used different language in the parallel stay termination provision in
section 362(c)(4)(i), relying upon the statutory construction doctrine
that “[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
64
or exclusion.”
This led the court to conclude that the stay
terminates under section 362(c)(3) only with respect to actions taken
against the debtor and property of the debtor, but not against
65
property of the estate. Because the court found the language to be
59. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3)(A).
60. 339 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
61. Id. at 361.
62. Id. at 363.
63. For example, the Jones court noted:
[s]ection 362(a)(1) stays actions or proceedings ‘against the debtor;’ §
362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a judgment ‘against the debtor or against
property of the estate;’ § 362(a)(3) stays ‘any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate;’ § 362(a)(4) stays ‘any
act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;’ §
362(a)(5) stays ‘any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien’ to the extent it secures a prepetition claim; and § 362(a)(6)
stays ‘any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor . . . .’
Id. at 363-64. Finally, the court noted that section 521(a)(6) requires the
termination of an automatic stay “with respect to the personal property of the
estate or of the debtor” if the debtor does not timely reaffirm or redeem
property. Id. at 364.
64. Id. at 364 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
65. Id. at 365. See also In re Moon, 339 B.R. 668, 671 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006)
(“Had the drafters of this provision intended that the whole of the automatic stay
would terminate, they could have easily just referenced § 362(a) as they did in

RAO.OFFTOPRINTER

1436

6/28/2006 9:17:17 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1427

clear, it did not consider legislative history that might have suggested
66
a different result. And as the final element of the court’s analysis, it
noted that there were policy arguments supporting this construction,
such as preserving property of the estate, which is often essential for
the success of debtors’ Chapter 13 plans and for the protection of
67
creditors in Chapter 7 cases.
C. “Exigent Circumstances”
To be eligible under section 109(h)(3) for a waiver of the prepetition credit counseling requirement, each of the following three
requirements must be satisfied: (1) the debtor’s certification must
describe exigent circumstances that merit a waiver; (2) the
certification must state that the debtor requested credit counseling
services from an approved agency, but the debtor was not able to
obtain the services during the five-day period beginning on the date
of the request; and (3) the certification must be satisfactory to the
68
court. Several initial decisions have sought to construe the “exigent
circumstances” language.
69
In In re Cleaver, the debtor filed a motion indicating that his
bankruptcy had been filed on an emergency basis because of a
pending sheriff’s sale of his home that was “scheduled for
70
tomorrow.” The court initially noted that although several of the
waiver requirements in section 109(h)(3) were clear, the statute was
71
ambiguous on the scope of “exigent circumstances.” Finding no
definition in the Bankruptcy Code, the court referred to Black’s Law
Dictionary, which defines the phrase as “[a] situation that demands
unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to
72
circumvent usual procedures . . . .” Although the debtor may have
had sufficient opportunity to obtain counseling and seek bankruptcy
relief before the sale, given that judicial foreclosures in Ohio take
many months to complete, the court nevertheless found that the
imminent sale satisfied the “exigent circumstances” requirement:
It can be argued that the exigency in this case is self-created. After
all, foreclosures in Ohio follow a lengthy judicial process, typically
§ 362(c)(4)(A) (‘the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing
of the later case’).”).
66. See Moon, 339 B.R. at 672 (noting the regrettable absence of legislative history
pertaining to Congress’s intent regarding the meaning of section 362(c)(3)).
67. Id.
68. In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
69. 333 B.R. 430 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005).
70. Id. at 434.
71. Id. at 435.
72. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004).
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lasting several months before the gavel finally falls at a sheriff’s sale.
Mr. Cleaver might have filed his bankruptcy a week, two weeks, or
even a month earlier thus allowing sufficient time to obtain the
briefing. However, the common reality is that many debtors file at
the last minute just before a foreclosure sale or the loss of their
money or possessions to creditors. Furthermore, it is difficult to
conceive of any exigent circumstances related to bankruptcy that
would not involve impending creditor action. Absent some sort of
immediate collection activity, there is no urgency affecting the
timing of a bankruptcy filing. Consequently, the immediacy of the
foreclosure sale in this case appears to be exactly the sort of exigent
73
circumstance contemplated by the statute.
74

The pro se debtor in In re LaPorta filed a statement with her
petition noting that she had checked the U.S. Trustee’s website to
locate a counseling agency and determined that “what [was] listed
was way beyond the territory [she could] afford to travel for time and
75
distance, and gas prices.” She filed a separate document stating that
76
her automobile was “up for repossession.” The court held that the
debtor was not entitled to a waiver under section 109(h)(3) because
she never actually made a request for services to an approved
77
agency. In a more troubling finding, the court questioned whether
the debtor had established exigent circumstances because her
Chapter 7 filing would only “defer the enforcement” of the
automobile lien, predicting that the lender would eventually obtain
78
stay relief. The court suggested that there would need to be some
showing by the debtor that the automobile lender was willing to make
“significant concessions” on the loan arrearage, since otherwise
“there is nothing to support a conclusion that the Debtor must file
79
now to gain some permanent benefit . . . .” Requiring the debtor to
prove some “permanent benefit” resulting from the bankruptcy filing
or forecast the post-petition treatment of a secured creditor goes well
beyond the plain meaning of “exigent circumstances” and surely is
80
not contemplated by section 109(h)(3).
73. Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435; see also In re Hubbard (Hubbard III), 333 B.R. 377,
384 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing that while automobile repossession and
pending foreclosure sale are deemed sufficient exigent circumstances, an “upcoming
sequestration hearing” involving an automobile where debtor failed to allege specific
facts describing emergency is not).
74. 332 B.R. 879 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
75. Id. at 880.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 883 (noting that Congress expressly stated that individuals who did
not follow these procedures could not be considered debtors).
78. Id. at 882.
79. Id.
80. See In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (clarifying that
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Unlike the “exigent circumstances” language, courts have found
the balance of the waiver section provisions to be clear and have felt
81
82
compelled to enforce them as written. In In re Gee, the debtor filed
a Chapter 13 petition and certification requesting a temporary waiver
of the counseling requirement based on a foreclosure sale of the
83
debtor’s home scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on the filing date. Although
the court easily found that exigent circumstances existed, the
debtor’s certification was fatally defective in that it failed to state that
counseling services were requested but were unable to be obtained
84
within a five-day period.
85
The debtor in In re Davenport argued that her failure to satisfy the
strict requirements of the statute could be excused on equitable
86
grounds. The debtor established that exigent circumstances existed
at the time the petition was filed, by showing that a creditor was
attempting to repossess the family’s automobile and only means of
87
transportation. However, the debtor did not certify that she had
88
requested credit counseling before filing. Instead, the debtor urged
the court to use its equitable powers to waive the requirement,
arguing that she had actually completed the counseling after the case
89
was filed.
The court held that it could not disregard the three
90
requirements in section 109(h)(3) and dismissed the case.
The court reached a similar result when the debtor in a Chapter 11
case argued, after his request for a waiver under section 109(h)(3)
had been rejected for failure to request counseling services prepetition, that the counseling requirement was unconstitutional. The

although a court may waive the requirement that a debtor obtain credit counseling
pre-petition, it is still necessary that the debtor meet the requirements of section
109(h)(3)(A) “in their exacting detail”).
81. See In re Hubbard (Hubbard I), 332 B.R. 285, 288 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005)
(“The Court sees no ambiguity in the statute.”).
82. 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id. at 603-04 (declining to ignore or relax the requirements stated in section
109). Accord In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Talib, 335
B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 887-88 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2005); In re Warden, No. 05-23750, 2005 WL 3207630, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
Nov. 22, 2005); In re Randolph, No. 05-15752-3P7, 2005 WL 3408043, at *1 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2005).
85. 335 B.R. 218 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
86. See id. at 221 (declining to disregard statutory requirements despite the
debtor’s arguments based in equity).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (pointing to the “emerging view” that a bankruptcy court may only
excuse compliance based on the three requirements of section 109(h)(3)).
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91

debtor in In re Watson contended that the counseling requirement
denied equal protection of the law to individuals like him who
operate businesses as sole proprietorships rather than as
92
corporations. Finding that an individual operating a business was
not a suspect class and that a rational basis existed for Congress’s
enactment of the counseling requirement, the court rejected the
93
equal protection argument.
94
Finally, the court in Hubbard III applied the plain language
doctrine of statutory construction to another provision in section
109(h)(3). The United States Trustee argued that the debtor must
personally make the request for counseling services before seeking a
95
waiver under section 109(h)(3). The court found no support for
this position in the statute and held that an attorney may make the
request as the debtor’s agent, provided that it is made on behalf of
96
the debtor in the case and is not simply a general inquiry. The U.S.
Trustee also argued that the debtor may not contact only one
counseling agency, suggesting that the debtor would have been able
to obtain pre-petition counseling had he contacted more of the seven
97
approved agencies in the district.
The court also rejected this
argument based on the plain wording of the statute, noting that
section 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) simply requires that the debtor have
“requested credit counseling services from an approved . . . agency,”
and therefore does not require a debtor to “scour the field before
98
determining that credit counseling is unavailable.”
D. “Any Amount Of Interest That Was Acquired”
Section 522(p)(1) provides that the debtor may not exempt “any
amount of interest that was acquired” in homestead property during
the 1215-day period before the filing of the petition that exceeds the
99
amount of $125,000. Although the facts of the case are not clearly

91. 332 B.R. 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
92. See id. at 744 (arguing that the debtor should not have to obtain credit
counseling before filing a petition simply because he chose to structure his business
as a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation, which does not need to obtain
credit counseling).
93. Id. at 746 (further arguing that a mere counseling requirement does not
“burden a fundamental right”).
94. In re Hubbard (Hubbard III), 333 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
95. Id. at 385.
96. Id.
97. See id. (noting, however, that a court may challenge the trustee’s
determination that adequate credit counseling was available to the debtor).
98. Id. at 387.
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(p)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).

RAO.OFFTOPRINTER

1440

6/28/2006 9:17:17 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1427
100

stated in the opinion, there was no dispute in In re Blair that the
debtors had acquired title to their homestead before the 1215-day
101
The issue before the court, based on an objection to the
period.
debtors’ homestead filed by an unsecured creditor, was whether the
debtors were subject to the $125,000 cap because they “continued to
make regular payments and build equity in the property during the
102
1215 day period.” The court initially noted: “one does not actually
103
‘acquire’ equity in a home. One acquires title to a home.”
Applying this construction of the statutory language, the court held
that the increase in value of the equity in the debtors’ homestead
during the 1215-day period was not subject to the $125,000 cap in
104
section 522(p). To bolster the statutory construction position, the
court found its holding to be consistent with the legislative history,
noting that section 522(p) was intended to restrict the “mansion
105
loophole.”
E. “Previous Principal Residence”
The $125,000 cap imposed by section 522(p)(1) does not apply to
any interest transferred from a debtor’s “previous principal
residence” to the debtor’s current principal residence if the debtor’s
previous residence was acquired before the 1215-day period and both
106
the previous and current residences are located in the same state.
107
The question in In re Wayrynen was whether this “safe harbor”
108
The
provision applies only to the most recent previous residence.
109
debtor purchased his first home prior to the 1215-day period. That
home was later sold and the debtor purchased a second home 966
100. 334 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
101. Id. at 376-77.
102. Id. at 375.
103. Id. at 376.
104. Id. at 378.
105. Id. at 377. The House Report on the 2005 Act, in referring to the change in
the domiciliary requirement in section 522(b)(3)(A), states:
Under current bankruptcy law, debtors living in certain states can shield
from their creditors virtually all of the equity in their homes. In light of this,
some debtors actually relocate to these states just to take advantage of their
‘mansion loophole’ laws. S.256 [BAPCPA] closes this loophole for abuse by
requiring a debtor to be a domiciliary in the state for at least two years before
he or she can claim that state’s homestead exemption; the current
requirement can be as little as 91 days.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt.1, at 15-16 (2005).
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(p)(2)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
107. 332 B.R. 479 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
108. See id. at 486 (examining whether such an interpretation of the statutory
language, “previous principal residence,” is too narrow).
109. See id. at 485 (providing a chart setting out the relevant dates and facts in this
case).
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110

days pre-petition.
Just prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtor sold
111
the second home and purchased his current residence. All of the
112
The Trustee argued there was
homes were located in Florida.
$25,000 in nonexempt equity in the current residence based on the
$125,000 cap because the home was purchased within 1215 days, and
section 522(p)(2)(B) did not apply because the first home could not
113
be considered the debtor’s “previous principal residence.”
The
court rejected the Trustee’s “narrow” construction of the statute,
finding that it was intended to prevent debtors from relocating to
“debtor-friendly” states and that the “safe harbor” in section
522(p)(2)(B) was intended to protect individuals like the debtor who
“simply have benefited as a result of their ownership of Florida real
property and the general appreciation of property values attributable
114
to previous intra-state transactions.”
IV. CONFUSING CONJUNCTIONS
A. “Delay, Hinder and Defraud Creditors”
The automatic stay is not applicable as to the enforcement of a lien
against, or security interest in, real property if an in rem order relating
to the property has been entered in a prior case under new sections
115
362(b)(20) and 362(d)(4).
An in rem order may be granted if a
creditor proves that (1) the filing of the petition was part of a scheme
to delay, hinder and defraud creditors, and (2) the scheme involved
either the transfer of full or partial interests in the property without
the approval of a secured creditor on the property or the bankruptcy
116
court, or multiple bankruptcy filings involving the same property.
Prior to the enactment of section 362(d)(4), the phrase “hinder,
delay or defraud” a creditor was found in sections 101(23), 548(a)
and 727(a)(2). This same “hinder, delay or defraud” phrase was also
added to the Code by the 2005 Act in new sections 522(o) and

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re Wayrynen, 332 B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
114. Id.
115. 11 U.S.C.A §§ 362(b)(20), 362(d)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). If the court
enters an in rem order and the order is properly recorded, the stay does not apply
with respect to the property in a later case filed within two years after the date of the
order.
116. See, e.g., In re Abdul Muhaiman, No. 05-90314-SD, 2006 WL 1153898, at *4
(Bankr. D. Md. 2006) (explaining that a court must affirmatively find that these
elements, along with fraud, are present in order to grant an in rem order).
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117

548(e). Significantly, in all of these provisions other than the stay
relief provision in section 362(d)(4), the words in the phrase are
joined by the conjunction “or” rather than “and.”
Courts will undoubtedly struggle with whether this was intentional
or the product of a drafting error. If the plain words are applied, the
burden of proof on a secured creditor will be substantial. Given the
drastic nature of in rem relief, however, it is certainly plausible that
Congress did purposely select this language so that such in rem orders
would be entered only in the rare case in which a creditor can prove
that the debtor’s filing of the petition was part of a scheme not only
118
to hinder and delay, but also to defraud the creditor.
B. “Willful and Malicious”
Section 1328(a)(4) creates a new type of Chapter 13 nondischargeability for an award of restitution or damages in a civil
action against the debtor, based on “willful or malicious” injury by the
119
debtor that caused personal injury or death of an individual. Since
section 523(a)(6) was not made applicable in Chapter 13 cases,
“willful and malicious” injury to property or to an individual that has
not been awarded restitution or damages continues to be
120
dischargeable in Chapter 13. While it is not clear that the “willful or
malicious” requirement in the new provision will be much different
121
than the “willful and malicious” test under current § 523(a)(6), it
seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a potentially less
stringent standard for non-dischargeability in Chapter 13 cases, given
its purported preference for having debtors file under Chapter 13
122
rather than Chapter 7.
C. Conjunctive “And” or Disjunctive “Or”
When Congress changes the conjunction “or” to “and,” joining a
list of items in an existing statute, should we assume this was done by

117. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(o), 548(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
118. Perhaps it is noteworthy that Congress changed the order of the words,
leading with “delay” in section 362(d)(4), and “hinder” in the other sections,
suggesting that Congress may have intended the phrase to have a different meaning.
119. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
120. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) (2000) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
121. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977-78 (1998) (finding that the word
“willful” modifies the word “injury,” which suggests an act must be intentional, rather
than merely reckless or negligent, regardless of whether or not malice is present).
122. See, e.g., Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13
Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 655, 668 (2005) (arguing that, in drafting BAPCPA,
Congress intended to create incentives for a greater number of debtors to pursue
relief under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7).
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design? The substitution of the disjunctive “or” for the conjunctive
“and” in section 1112(b) makes clear that the drafting problems in
the 2005 Act are not limited to the consumer provisions.
Section 1112(b) provides for the dismissal or conversion of a
123
Chapter 11 case for cause.
Prior to the 2005 Act, the statute
contained a list of ten factors a moving party could rely upon in
124
establishing “cause.”
Because the conjunction “or” was used, a
court could dismiss or convert the case if only one of the listed factors
for cause was proven. The statute was amended in 2005 to expand
125
the list to sixteen factors and to replace the “or” with “and.”
126
The court in In re TCR of Denver, LLC was asked to decide
whether the plain words of the amendment should be given effect,
thereby requiring that all of the factors establishing cause must now
127
be shown. Unlike many of the early decisions construing the 2005
Act, the court was not confronted with a close call and quickly
recognized that strict application of the plain meaning rule would
128
produce a nonsensical result. Requiring proof of all sixteen factors,
some of which apply only to individual Chapter 11 debtors, would
render the provision meaningless as virtually no corporate Chapter
11 could ever be dismissed for cause. The court succinctly describes
the amendment as follows:
This is a case where the language of BAPCPA passed by Congress
tends to defy logic and clash with common sense. This is an
example of a specific revision to the Bankruptcy Code, if followed
by the Court and applied as Congress seems to intend—i.e., by way
of strict construction—would result in an absurd decision and
129
totally unworkable legal precedent.

V. SCRIVENER’S ERRORS
A. “As a Result of Electing”
Of the three new homestead limitations added by the 2005 Act,
both sections 522(p) and (q) use language different from that found
in section 522(o), in describing when the limitations apply. Sections
123. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000), amended by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
125. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b).
126. 338 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).
127. Id. at 497.
128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the court’s estimation
of the Bankruptcy Code revisions).
129. TCR of Denver, 338 B.R. at 495-96.
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522(p) and (q), unlike section 522(o), state that the provisions apply
only “as a result of electing under subsection (b)(3)(A) to exempt
130
property under State or local law.” Thus, in order to give meaning
to the plain words of the phrase “as a result of electing,” the court in
131
In re McNabb held that sections 522(p) and (q) are applicable only
in states which have not opted out of the federal exemption scheme,
because non-opt out states are the only states in which an “election” is
132
available.
The McNabb holding and rationale were promptly rejected in a
133
series of opinions. In In re Kaplan, the court found that although
the construction of the statutory language set forth in McNabb “is
supportable based on the language as drafted,” it should be rejected
134
because of clear legislative intent to the contrary. Interestingly, the
Kaplan court resorted to a review of the legislative history without
clearly demonstrating that the “electing” language was ambiguous or
135
that the McNabb construction was absurd. Citing several references
in the legislative history suggesting that Congress’ intent was to
restrict the “mansion loophole,” the court held that the statute
136
should be construed as applying in all states, even opt-out states.
The McNabb and Kaplan approaches were both rejected in In re
137
Reaching the same holding as Kaplan, however, the
Virissimo.
Virissimo court attempted to do so in a manner consistent with the
statute’s plain meaning, by finding that there is an “election” of sorts
for all debtors, even those in opt-out states, though the “election may
become ineffective if the debtor chooses a federal exemption in an
138
opt-out state . . . .”
This construction of the existing language in
section 522 permitted the court to reach a result in accordance with

130. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(p)(1), 522(q)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
131. 326 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
132. Id. at 788.
133. 331 B.R. 483 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
134. Id. at 486.
135. Cf. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
136. See Kaplan, 331 B.R. at 488 (finding no evidence in the statute’s legislative
history that would lead the court to conclude that Congress intended the new
provisions to apply in some non opt-out states and not others). Accord In re Landahl,
338 B.R. 920, 922 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (reviewing legislative history to conclude
that Congress intended to close the “mansion loophole” in all states); In re Wayrynen,
332 B.R. 479 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (concluding that legislative history demonstrates
that Congress intended the section 522(p)(1) limitations to apply to all debtors).
137. 332 B.R. 201, 205-06 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
138. Id. at 205.
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the new provision’s apparent intent without relying upon legislative
history.
139
Finally, the court in In re Kane rejected the McNabb holding by
staking out yet another approach to the statutory construction
dilemma posed by the “electing” language. Following a detailed
discussion of the court’s authority to reform a statute when
confronted with a certain scrivener’s error, the Kane court concluded
that Congress should be saved from its apparent drafting error by
140
effectively striking the “electing” language from the statute.
Curiously, although the statutory construction argument is wellresearched and carefully laid out, the court did not discuss the most
recent decision of the Supreme Court addressing scrivener’s errors in
141
the context of bankruptcy legislation. The Lamie v. U.S. Trustee
decision makes clear that courts should rarely find that such errors
exist, particularly when there is at least some reasonable
interpretation of the language. As Lamie instructs, a statute may be
“awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that does not make it
142
ambiguous.”
The Virissimo court offers one such plausible construction of the
language. Another explanation for the “electing” language, not yet
considered by any of the cases, is that Congress intended the new
homestead limitations to apply when the debtor elects to exempt
homestead property under section 522(b)(3)(A), but not when the
debtor elects to exempt under section 522(b)(3)(B) (formerly
section 522(b)(2)(B)) homestead property held as a tenant by the
entirety or by joint tenancy, if that interest is exempt from process
under nonbankruptcy law. The existence of section 522(b)(3)(B)
points to another form of election available to debtors. Moreover,
the exemption under section 522(b)(3)(B) is available to debtors in
all states to the extent recognized by state law, even in opt-out states,
and would therefore suggest a reason why Congress may have
included the “electing” language.
CONCLUSION
Congress, not the courts, should take on the monumental task of
fixing the numerous drafting errors in the 2005 Act. This time,
however, it is essential that Congress shun the efforts of lobbyists to
139. 336 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
140. See id. at 489 (supporting this conclusion by stating that “the scrivener’s error
is obvious from the extensive record and from common sense”).
141. 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
142. Id. at 534.
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provide actual statutory language.
Rather, Congress must permit
the legislation to be vetted in the time-honored tradition of
bankruptcy legislation in which the comments of practitioners,
scholars and bankruptcy judges are considered. Until such time,
though, participants in the bankruptcy system must look for ways to
work around the numerous problems in the current legislation and
should ignore the statutory language only in rare circumstances.

143. One commentator has noted that “[i]n contrast to the 1978 legislation, which
was crafted with extensive assistance from many of the finest minds in the bankruptcy
world, many of the consumer provisions of the 2005 legislation were largely drafted
by lobbyists with limited knowledge of real-life consumer bankruptcy practice.”
Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
191, 191-92 (2005).

